Why Senator John McCain Cannot be President: Eleven Months and a Hundred Yards Short of Citizenship by Chin, Gabriel
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Volume 107
2008
Why Senator John McCain Cannot be President:




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Election Law Commons, and the
Legislation Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review First Impressions by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gabriel Chin, Why Senator John McCain Cannot be President: Eleven Months and a Hundred Yards Short of Citizenship, 107 Mich. L.
Rev. First Impressions 1 (2008).
Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol107/iss1/23
CHIN FI FTP 2M.DOC 9/30/2008 12:35 PM 
 
1 
WHY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN CANNOT 
BE PRESIDENT: ELEVEN MONTHS AND A 
HUNDRED YARDS SHORT OF CITIZENSHIP 
Gabriel J. Chin* † 
Introduction.......................................................................................... 1 
 I. Was the Canal Zone “the United States” for Purposes 
of the Citizenship Clause?..................................................... 4 
A. The Canal Zone and Other Unincorporated Territories 
Are Not “the United States”.................................................. 4 
B. Natives of Unincorporated Territories Are Not Citizens ....... 4 
 II. Natural Born Citizenship as a Child of Citizens ............. 5 
A. Citizenship and Natural Born Citizenship by Statute............ 5 
B. Citizenship by Descent in 1936: “The Canal Zone 
Is a ‘No Man’s Land’ ”.......................................................... 6 
C. Should Section 1993 Be Re-drafted to Fix 
Congressional Error?............................................................ 9 
D. The Politics of Canal Zone Citizenship ............................... 11 
 III. Senator McCain’s Paths to Natural Born Citizenship . 14 
A. Restricting Congressional Power by Overruling 
the Insular Cases.................................................................. 15 
B. Restricting Congressional Power by Recognizing 
Common Law Citizenship.................................................... 16 
C. Restricting Congressional Power by Overruling 
the Plenary Power Doctrine ................................................ 16 
Conclusion ........................................................................................... 17 
Appendix A ............................................................................................ 19 
Introduction 
Article II, section 1 of the Constitution provides that “No Person except 
a natural born Citizen . . . shall be eligible to the Office of President . . . .” A 
person must be a citizen at birth to be a natural born citizen. Senator 
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McCain was born in the Canal Zone in 1936. Although he is now a U.S. 
citizen, the law in effect in 1936 did not grant him citizenship at birth. Be-
cause he was not born a citizen, he is not eligible to the office of president. 
The citizenship of those born in the Canal Zone in 1936 is a legal ques-
tion, not a question about one’s views of Senator McCain’s candidacy. U.S. 
citizenship law is not simple or intuitive. As the child of two U.S. citizens, 
and because his father was on active duty in the U.S. Navy, it might seem 
obvious and logical that he must have been a citizen at birth. However, nei-
ther in 1936 nor at any other time did Congress confer citizenship based on 
these facts alone—the law always required additional circumstances.  
The Supreme Court has held that there are only two ways to become a 
citizen: 1) birth in the United States, thus becoming a citizen under the citi-
zenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or 2) satisfaction of every 
requirement of a statute enacted by Congress granting citizenship to a class 
of people. The second category includes naturalization of individual adults 
or children already born; collective naturalization of groups, such as natives 
of territory acquired by the United States; and naturalization at birth of cer-
tain classes of children born abroad to citizens. Those born in the United 
States are uncontroversially natural born citizens. There is also a strong ar-
gument that those obtaining citizenship at birth by statute are natural born 
citizens, well articulated by Charles Gordon in Who Can be President of the 
United States: The Unresolved Enigma. However, natural born citizenship 
can be acquired only at the moment of birth. As stated by the leading 
Supreme Court case, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, “ ‘British subject’ 
means any person who owes permanent allegiance to the crown. . . . ‘Natu-
ral-born British subject’ means a British subject who has become a British 
subject at the moment of his birth.”  
In 1936, the Canal Zone fell into a gap in the law, covered neither by the 
citizenship clause nor Revised Statutes section 1993 (passed as the Act of 
May 24, 1934), the only statute applicable to births to U.S. citizens outside 
the United States. As then-Representative John Sparkman explained in 
1937: “the Canal Zone is not such foreign territory as to come under the law 
of 1855 [Revised Statutes section 1993] and, on the other hand, it is not part 
of the United States which would bring it within the fourteenth amend-
ment.” The problem was well known; Richard W. Flournoy’s 1934 
American Bar Association Journal article, Proposed Codification of Our 
Chaotic Nationality Laws, explained “we have no statutory provisions defin-
ing the nationality status of persons born in the Canal Zone . . . .”  
Because the Canal Zone was a “no man’s land,” in the words of Represen-
tative Sparkman, in 1937 Congress passed a statute, the Act of Aug. 4, 1937 
(now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1403(a)) granting citizenship to “[a]ny person 
born in the Canal Zone on or after February 26, 1904” who had at least one 
U.S. citizen parent. This Act made Senator McCain a U.S. citizen before his 
first birthday. But again, to be a natural born citizen, one must be a citizen at 
the moment of birth. Since Senator McCain became a citizen in his eleventh 
month of life, he does not satisfy this criterion, is not a natural born citizen, 
and thus is not “eligible to the Office of President.” 
The Senator’s citizenship cannot be ignored. Indeed, the McCain cam-
paign itself made an issue of it, requesting Harvard Law Professor Laurence 
H. Tribe and former Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson to offer an opinion 
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about Senator McCain’s citizenship (included here as Appendix A). These 
distinguished constitutional lawyers issued a detailed legal analysis of why 
Senator McCain was a natural born citizen. This opinion was publicly re-
leased and made part of the Congressional Record on April 30, 2008. At 
least in partial reliance on the opinion, the Senate resolved on the same day 
that Senator McCain was a natural born citizen. Senator McCain apparently 
adopted the opinion’s reasoning by having his lawyers use the arguments in 
support of a motion to dismiss in Hollander v. McCain, a lawsuit filed in the 
District of New Hampshire challenging his eligibility. Not surprisingly, the 
Senate, constitutional scholars, and the campaign itself consider the issue of 
constitutional eligibility to be important. 
Of course, McCain’s lack of citizenship at birth is a technicality ne plus 
ultra. Presidential candidates who obtained their citizenship after birth are 
no more likely to be disloyal than those born citizens, and the people of the 
United States should be allowed to elect whomever they choose. Therefore, 
as a policy matter, Senator McCain should be eligible to be president. Yet 
the text of the Constitution forbids it. The rule of law would be mortally 
wounded if courts, Congress, or the executive could legitimately ignore pro-
visions of law they deemed obsolete under the circumstances. It would be a 
grim moment in history if the very oath to “preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution” that made a person president were also a falsehood that defied 
the document.  
This commentary responds to the Tribe-Olson Opinion. Part I responds 
to the argument that if the United States were “sovereign” over the Canal 
Zone, “that fact alone would make him a ‘natural born’ citizen under the 
well-established principle that ‘natural born’ citizenship includes birth 
within the territory and allegiance of the United States.” It contends that all 
courts considering the issue, including the Supreme Court (albeit in dicta), 
hold that persons born in unincorporated territories like the Canal Zone are 
not, for that reason alone, U.S. citizens. A number of individuals born in the 
Canal Zone under U.S. jurisdiction have been deported from the United 
States, even one claiming to be a birthright citizen under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Part II examines the argument that Senator McCain was a citizen by 
birth under an Act of Congress. By its text, Revised Statutes section 1993, 
cited by the Tribe-Olson Opinion and the only such statute in effect in 1936, 
did not apply to the Canal Zone, which was outside the “limits” of the 
United States as an unincorporated territory but within the “jurisdiction” of 
the United States as land over which the nation exercised permanent exclu-
sive control. Accordingly, in 1937, Congress legislated for the Canal Zone 
specifically, granting citizenship to children born there. This was too late to 
make children already born citizens at birth.  
As Part III explains, the Tribe-Olson Opinion suggests possibilities for 
restructuring harsh doctrines of the contemporary constitutional law of 
immigration, naturalization, and citizenship, in ways making Senator 
McCain eligible to the office of president. However, in a government of 
laws, constitutional principles apply to all, not just particular individuals. If 
President McCain believed that the Constitution, correctly interpreted, made 
him a citizen at birth, he would have the power to implement some of these 
views by executive order and regulation and urge Congress to adopt others 
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into statutory law. Part III explains how the legal changes necessary to make 
a person born in the Canal Zone in 1936 a citizen at birth would grant 
citizenship to thousands or millions of people now legally aliens.  
I. Was the Canal Zone “the United States” 
for Purposes of the Citizenship Clause? 
The first sentence of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .” Persons born in 
the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are natural born citi-
zens as, for example, the Supreme Court held in Rogers v. Bellei. But the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not define the “United States.” Surely it in-
cludes the states, but it does not say what else, if anything, it covers. 
The Tribe-Olson Opinion suggests that the Canal Zone was part of the 
United States for constitutional purposes and, therefore, that the citizenship 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied of its own force. However, in a 
body of decisions called the Insular Cases, the Court extensively explored 
the constitutional status of places like the Canal Zone and held that the Con-
stitution did not apply in full.  
A. The Canal Zone and Other Unincorporated Territories 
Are Not “the United States” 
The Insular Cases arose after the United States acquired overseas pos-
sessions following the Spanish American War. The Court held in 1905 in 
Rasmussen v. United States that the Constitution’s application turned on 
whether a particular territory “has been incorporated into the United States 
as a part thereof, or is simply held . . . under the sovereignty of the United 
States as a possession or dependency.” If incorporated, the full Constitution 
applied. But, as the Court stated in 1901 in Downes v. Bidwell, an unincor-
porated territory was “not a part of the United States” for constitutional 
purposes, so only a limited set of fundamental rights restricted congres-
sional authority. The law is summarized in the remarkable amicus brief in 
Boumediene v. Bush, authored by Gerald L. Neuman, Harold Hongju Koh, 
Sarah H. Cleveland, and Margaret L. Sanner and joined by other major con-
stitutional scholars including Professor Tribe. The brief explained that under 
the Insular Cases, “only ‘fundamental’ constitutional rights extended by 
their own force to ‘unincorporated’ territories. . . . The Insular Cases struck 
a compromise between the forces of constitutionalism and the forces of em-
pire by guaranteeing that the Constitution’s most fundamental rights would 
be honored wherever the United States possesses governing authority.” 
Federal courts, like the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. 
Husband R. (Roach), have held that during the period of U.S. jurisdiction 
“[t]he Canal Zone is an unincorporated territory of the United States.”  
B. Natives of Unincorporated Territories Are Not Citizens 
The Boumediene opinion confirms that the Insular Cases remain good 
law. Downes, the first Insular Case, explained that the lesser privileges 
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permissibly denied in unincorporated territories include “the right[] to 
citizenship.” Accordingly, persons born in the Canal Zone are not citizens 
under the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they 
were not born in “the United States.”  
Most cases about citizenship by birth in an unincorporated territory ad-
dress the Philippines. Courts, including the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) and the U.S. Supreme Court, agree with the Ninth Circuit’s state-
ment in Rabang v. I.N.S that “birth in the Philippines during the territorial 
period does not constitute birth ‘in the United States’ under the Citizenship 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus does not give rise to United 
States citizenship.” Thus, individuals born in the Canal Zone under U.S. juris-
diction have been deported or convicted of unlawful presence in the United 
States—for example, the BIA case In re Martiza Ellis A.K.A. Maritza M. Ellis 
held that the party did not gain U.S. nationality by birth in Canal Zone. Con-
trary to the Tribe-Olson Opinion, under existing Supreme Court decisions, 
Senator McCain’s birth in the Canal Zone, by itself, cannot make him a 
natural born citizen; it did not make him a citizen at all. 
II. Natural Born Citizenship as a Child of Citizens 
If Senator McCain was not born in the United States for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, under the traditional view of citizenship law, if he 
is to be a citizen it is necessary to find a statute making him one. In 1936, no 
statute granted citizenship to children of U.S. citizens born in the Canal 
Zone. 
A. Citizenship and Natural Born Citizenship by Statute 
According to the Supreme Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the 
Constitution “contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth 
and naturalization.” Unless born in the United States, a person “can only 
become a citizen by being naturalized . . . by authority of congress, exer-
cised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the 
enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens, or 
by enabling foreigners individually to become citizens . . . .” A person 
granted citizenship by birth outside the United States to citizen parents is 
naturalized at birth; he or she is both a citizen by birth and a naturalized 
citizen. This last point is discussed thoroughly in Jill A. Pryor’s 1988 note in 
the Yale Law Journal, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential 
Eligibility: An Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty. 
The Supreme Court holds that the citizenship statutes are exclusive; 
there is no residual common-law or natural-law citizenship. Citizens have 
no constitutional right to transmit their citizenship to children. In Rogers, 
the Supreme Court upheld a statute requiring children born overseas to citi-
zen parents to reside in the United States to retain their citizenship. Since 
“Congress may withhold citizenship from persons” born overseas to citizen 
parents or “deny [them] citizenship outright,” it could impose the lesser bur-
den of requiring U.S. residence to retain citizenship.  
Congressional power to withhold citizenship from children of U.S. citi-
zens is not hypothetical; for decades, it was law, and to some extent still is. 
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The Tribe-Olson Opinion proposes that “[i]t goes without saying that the 
Framers did not intend to exclude a person from the office of the President 
simply because he or she was born to U.S. citizens serving in the U.S. mili-
tary outside of the continental United States . . . .” However, the Seventh 
Congress, which included Framers Gouverneur Morris and Abraham Bald-
win among others, did precisely that. In 1961 in Montana v. Kennedy, the 
Supreme Court construed an 1802 statute to mean that “[f]oreign-born chil-
dren of persons who became American citizens between April 14, 1802 and 
1854, were aliens . . . .” Thus, children of members of the armed forces serv-
ing overseas, and diplomats and civil servants in foreign posts, were not 
only not natural born citizens eligible to be president, they were not citizens 
at all. 
Denial of automatic citizenship had very different implications than it 
would now because until the late nineteenth century, there was little federal 
immigration law. There were no general federal restrictions on who could 
enter the country, no provisions for deportation of residents who became 
undesirable, and immigration officials to deport them. Of course, these chil-
dren could become citizens by individual naturalization. But even if the 
child suffered based on lack of citizenship, according to the 1907 Supreme 
Court decision in Zartarian v. Billings, “[a]s this subject is entirely within 
congressional control, the matter must rest there; it is only for the courts to 
apply the law as they find it.”  
B. Citizenship by Descent in 1936: “The Canal Zone 
Is a ‘No Man’s Land’ ” 
In 1936, when Senator McCain was born, Revised Statutes section 1993 
governed citizenship of children born overseas to U.S. citizen parents. It did 
not grant citizenship to those born in the Canal Zone. Although the original 
version of section 1993 dated to 1855 (passed to reverse the policy de-
scribed in Montana v. Kennedy), the version in force in 1936 became law 
two years earlier with the passage of the Act of May 24, 1934. It granted 
citizenship to “[a]ny child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of 
the United States, whose father or mother or both at the time of the birth of 
such child is a citizen of the United States . . . .” 
By its terms, section 1993 applied if the Canal Zone is “out of the limits 
and jurisdiction of the United States.” By the rule of the Insular Cases, the 
Canal Zone was not the “United States,” so the first criterion is satisfied. 
However, given exclusive U.S. control of the Canal Zone, it was not out of 
the “jurisdiction” of the United States. The 1926 version of 8 U.S.C. § 173 
made U.S. jurisdiction clear. Similarly, the 2007 amicus brief of constitu-
tional law professors in Boumediene, joined by Professor Tribe, refers to 
“territory outside U.S. territorial borders and sovereignty, but still under the 
complete jurisdiction and control of the United States: most prominently, 
the Canal Zone in Panama . . . .”  
Because the Canal Zone was neither the United States nor foreign, Con-
gress recognized a problem with the citizenship of Zone-born children. In 
1937, Congress passed a specific statute granting citizenship to children of 
U.S. citizens born in the Canal Zone. Still in force, the Act of August 4, 
1937 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1403(a)) provides: 
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Any person born in the Canal Zone on or after February 26, 1904, and 
whether before or after the effective date of this chapter, whose father or 
mother or both at the time of the birth of such person was or is a citizen of 
the United States, is declared to be a citizen of the United States. 
The legislative history explains the basis for the law. In 1937, the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service was part of the Department of Labor. As 
noted in Senate Report Number 75-678, Labor Secretary Frances Perkins 
explained that children born to U.S. citizens in the Canal Zone “are citizens 
in every sense except as a matter of law.” Because “the Canal Zone is not an 
incorporated territory of the United States, hence not ‘a part of’ or ‘in’ the 
United States, there is doubt that any of the persons described in the bill are 
citizens of the United States under the Constitution or any existing statutes 
even though the Canal Zone is under the jurisdiction of the United States.” 
The House Report, Number 75-1303, observed that “the citizenship of 
persons born in the Canal Zone of American parents, has never been defined 
either by the Constitution, treaty or congressional enactment.” Canal–Zone-
born children are not covered by the “statutes on citizenship” because they 
“are not outside the jurisdiction of the United States, neither are they within 
the limits of the United States.” Thus, “[e]ven children born within the limits 
of the Zone which is under the jurisdiction of the United States are not citi-
zens.” 
In the brief Senate debate on the bill (appearing in Volume 81 of the 
Congressional Record), Senator Bennett Champ Clark said that “existing 
law is changed” in that citizenship would be granted to children of U.S. citi-
zens born in the Canal Zone. In the House, John Sparkman explained: 
It has been held that the Canal Zone is not such foreign territory as to 
come under the law of 1855 [Revised Statutes section 1993] and, on the 
other hand, it is not part of the United States which would bring it within 
the fourteenth amendment; consequently there has been great doubt about 
the citizenship status of children born in the Canal Zone.  
Sparkman concluded: “The Canal Zone is a ‘no man’s land.’ Every place in 
the world except the Canal Zone has been covered either by the law of 1855, 
which applies to foreign countries, or by the fourteenth amendment, which 
applies to the United States and its possessions.”  
Of course, doubts about section 1993’s application might be mistaken. If 
Senator McCain was born a citizen in 1936 by virtue of section 1993, Con-
gress in 1937 cannot reverse that, even by legislation. Conceivably, the 1937 
statute was somehow redundant of section 1993, just as part of the citizen-
ship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is now repeated verbatim in 8 
U.S.C. § 1401(a). However, the concern of Congress was justified because 
persons born in the Canal Zone were not covered by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the text of section 1993 or the statute’s original public 
meaning.  
The Constitution’s text itself demonstrates that United States “jurisdic-
tion” and “the United States” in a territorial sense are distinct concepts. As 
the Downes Court stated, “The 13th Amendment to the Constitution, prohib-
iting slavery and involuntary servitude ‘within the United States, or in any 
place subject to their jurisdiction,’ . . . show[s] that there may be places 
within the jurisdiction of the United States that are no part of the Union.”  
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The Constitution is consistent with American citizenship law generally, 
which has always been concerned with both national limits and national 
jurisdiction in granting citizenship or subjectship. Calvin’s Case, decided in 
1608, was the primary basis of citizenship law in England and the United 
States at least until its principles were embodied in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In it, Lord Coke explained that a person was a natural born subject if 
“the parents be under the actual obedience of the King” and that “the place 
of his birth be within the King’s dominion.” The 1802 Act where the “limits 
and jurisdiction” language first appeared in another section made clear that 
it contemplated that the words indicated distinct things; it provided for natu-
ralization for certain people “residing within the limits, and under the 
jurisdiction of the United States.” Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires both birth in the United States and being subject to its jurisdiction. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act now distinguishes between the United 
States proper and U.S. territory for purposes of granting citizenship. Thus, 
American citizenship law from the common-law era to the present ascribes 
distinct meaning to the “limits” and “jurisdiction” of the United States. It 
should not be surprising if section 1993 did as well. 
And so the Supreme Court determined. In Wong Kim Ark, the Court 
construed a passage of the 1855 version of what became section 1993; that 
language remained unchanged in the 1934 revision. The Court held that the 
phrases “in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the 
citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “must be presumed to have 
been understood and intended by [Congress and the States as] . . . the con-
verse of the words ‘out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States’ as 
habitually used in the naturalization acts.” That is, jurisdiction in section 
1993 means the same thing as it does in the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Wong Kim Ark held that natives and citizens of China living in the Unit-
ed States were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States because they 
“are entitled to the protection of and owe allegiance to the United States, so 
long as they are permitted by the United States to reside here, and are ‘sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof’ in the same sense as all other aliens residing 
in the United States.” Based on The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, an 
1812 decision by Chief Justice Marshall, Wong Kim Ark found persons not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to include “children of for-
eign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of 
enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory . . . .” 
Accordingly, in a territorial sense, individuals are within a country’s juris-
diction if they are in a place that obligates them to that nation. In this 
context, jurisdiction cannot have meant a nation’s worldwide authority to 
regulate its citizens because so construed, the statute would never apply to 
anyone. Wong Kim Ark thus recognizes four categories. A person can be: 1) 
both in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, like a Chinese im-
migrant in California; 2) neither in the United States nor subject to its 
jurisdiction, like a Brazilian citizen in São Paulo; 3) in the United States but 
not subject to its jurisdiction, like a British soldier occupying Washington, 
D.C. during the War of 1812; or 4) out of the United States but subject to its 
jurisdiction, like a U.S. merchant on a guano island—one of the unclaimed, 
commercially valuable islands that Congress provided could be made U.S. 
territory upon application of a U.S. petitioner. Only persons born in the first 
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category are citizens by birth under the Fourteenth Amendment; only those 
born in the second category to U.S. citizens are covered by section 1993.  
The Canal Zone is in the fourth category. Under the doctrine of the Insu-
lar Cases, the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization’s 
conclusion that “Children of American parents in the Canal Zone are not 
outside the jurisdiction of the United States, neither are they within the lim-
its of the United States” is inescapable. As an unincorporated territory, the 
Canal Zone is not “the United States.” At the same time, if, as Wong Kim 
Ark held, Chinese living in the United States owed at least temporary alle-
giance and were entitled to protection, then children of U.S. citizens born in 
the Canal Zone also could be expected to receive the protection of law and 
not to violate its laws. A 1907 Attorney General opinion so held.  
C. Should Section 1993 Be Re-drafted to Fix Congressional Error? 
Section 1993 could be construed based on what we imagine to be its 
spirit rather than its language and the “and jurisdiction” requirement read 
out. Alternatively, perhaps Congress meant to grant citizenship when the 
parents were outside the “limits or jurisdiction,” of the United States and 
not, as they wrote, “limits and jurisdiction.” If so, perhaps the apparent 
statutory requirement that the birth be outside U.S. “jurisdiction” should be 
ignored. Indeed, there was testimony at the July 21, 1937 hearing before the 
House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on the 1937 Act indi-
cating that the State Department held that view. The Department thus 
regarded children of U.S. citizens born in outlying possessions as citizens, 
although there was also testimony that other agencies disagreed. Reading 
“and jurisdiction” out of section 1993 would mean persons born in the Ca-
nal Zone in 1936 are citizens at birth because they would meet the 
requirements of the statute as revised. 
This reading would not be a fair reading, at least under conservative 
principles of construction, because the plain meaning is perfectly sensible. 
Like the natural born citizen clause itself, the language of section 1993 was 
not intended to correlate with the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which had not yet been imagined when the earlier provisions 
became law. Stephen Sachs plausibly argues that Congress likely imagined 
that it created a “gapless” system, granting citizenship by one means or an-
other to children of U.S. citizens wherever born. Even assuming that this 
could be conclusively shown, the unenacted intent could not override the 
text. As the Court said in Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, “[i]f Congress enacted into 
law something different from what it intended, then it should amend the 
statute to conform it to its intent. ‘It is beyond our province to rescue Con-
gress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think . . . is 
the preferred result’ ” (quoting United States v. Granderson). 
In 1855, the statute probably did operate gaplessly because the limits of 
the United States were identical (or nearly so) to its jurisdiction, so anywhere 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not grant citizenship, section 1993 would, and 
vice-versa. For this reason, the terms could be used interchangeably. The 
problem was not created by legal or technological developments beyond the 
control of Congress, but because Congress itself created areas within U.S. 
jurisdiction but outside its limits. Congress decided the terms should no 
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longer be identical, but did not revise all of the laws potentially affected by 
its decision.  As Justice Holmes stated, in McBoyle v. United States, the pas-
sage of time and unanticipated factual developments do not give courts free 
rein to rewrite statutes; a “statute should not be extended . . . simply because 
it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the speculation that, 
if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have 
been used.” 
The conservative result—application of the original public meaning of 
the plain language—is what obtains under existing law. First, ambiguous 
citizenship statutes are construed against the grant of citizenship. The courts 
and the executive agree (here, in a 1935 Attorney General opinion quoting 
United States v. Manzi) that “[c]itizenship is a high privilege, and when 
doubts exist concerning a grant of it, generally at least, they should be re-
solved in favor of the United States and against the claimant.” Congress has 
apparently never rejected this approach.  
Nor can the plain meaning of the statute be disregarded through applica-
tion of the canon of avoiding absurd results. Absurdity or lack thereof must 
be measured at the time of enactment because the canon is a method of 
evaluating meaning. In 1855, when section 1993 first became law, there 
might have been no places outside the territory but within the jurisdiction, 
so no absurdity was created by requiring both. Perhaps the first zones out of 
the U.S. but within its jurisdiction were the guano islands created by statute 
in 1856, in provisions codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 1411–1419. It would not 
have been absurd for Congress to leave citizenship on these mostly unpopu-
lated islands to the general naturalization laws or to more specific future 
regulation as knowledge of actual conditions developed. 
Leaving the problem to Congress is particularly justified here. Of 
course, in 1855, Congress could not have foreseen that decades hence it 
would create the Canal Zone, so it could not have consciously legislated for 
it or any place like it. But if we conclude that Congress in the mid-
nineteenth century would have wanted to grant citizenship to those born in 
the Canal Zone had they anticipated its creation, we must determine which 
statute will be extended. The Canal Zone could be covered by section 1993, 
on the assumption that Congress would have wanted to treat U.S. territory as 
if it were the same as foreign territory. Alternatively, the Canal Zone could 
be covered by section 1992, the citizenship provision of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, on the assumption that Congress would have wanted to treat U.S. 
territory as part of the United States. But this construction would also grant 
citizenship to all children born in the territories, even if their parents were 
not U.S. citizens. A dynamic statutory interpreter applying the spirit of the 
laws might attempt to close the gap; a conservative would say that the only 
way to identify whether a gap arising decades after enactment is, in fact, 
unintentional is for courts to do nothing and allow Congress to exercise its 
constitutional power of legislation. 
As it happened, Congress found neither section 1992 nor section 1993 to 
be the proper model for the territories. The current version of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401, has distinct rules for 
citizenship by descent for those born in the United States, those born outside 
of both the United States and its outlying possessions, and those born out-
side the United States but in its outlying possessions. That is, the law still 
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treats U.S. jurisdiction and the United States proper as two related but dif-
ferent things, just as the plain language of section 1993 suggests.  
The plain language, prior judicial construction, actions of Congress, and 
use of the words in related law all point in the same direction. Because per-
sons born in unincorporated territories such as the Canal Zone were out of 
the United States but within its jurisdiction, section 1993 did not apply. 
Since there was no other law granting citizenship in effect, children of citi-
zens born before 1937 in the Canal Zone were not citizens at birth. 
D. The Politics of Canal Zone Citizenship 
In the era of Senator McCain’s birth, the Canal Zone citizenship prob-
lem had not been overlooked; nationality law was in notorious disarray. A 
State Department official wrote in the ABA Journal in 1934 that “[p]robably 
no branch of the law in this country is more open to criticism upon the 
grounds of instability, inconsistency and ambiguity than that governing na-
tionality, or citizenship.” However, for a variety of reasons, Congress 
legislated slowly. 
Congress was informed about the gap in the law with regard to the unin-
corporated territories no later than 1932. Commissioner of Naturalization 
Raymond F. Crist testified before the House Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization on a bill, H.R. 5489, proposing to grant citizenship to for-
eign-born children with U.S. citizen mothers.  
The Commissioner’s testimony reflected the precise nature of the prob-
lem. He insisted that “[t]here are cases left out which should be included in 
this bill,” specifically “children born of American parents who are not citi-
zens by section 1992, [and] children born in the Philippine Islands, as to 
whom neither the Constitution nor any statute declares affirmatively that 
they are citizens of the United States.” The problem was that “those born 
within the jurisdiction of the United States are not declared citizens of the 
United States.” The gap was “not limited to the Philippines” but extended to 
“any place under the jurisdiction of the United States.”  
This testimony did not persuade the Seventy-Second Congress to act 
with respect to either children born in the unincorporated territories or to 
those born to U.S. citizen mothers; both groups were left aliens. However, in 
April 1933, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 6115 directing 
the Departments of State, Labor, and Justice to prepare a report on the na-
tionality laws of the United States and to recommend revisions to Congress.  
Commenting in March 1933 on the bill pending in the Seventy-Third 
Congress that later became section 1993, Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
urged delay. But if Congress could not wait, he offered a draft with separate 
nationality provisions for those born in the United States, those born out of 
the United States and its outlying possessions, and those born in the outly-
ing possessions, thus fixing the gap that Commissioner Crist identified in 
section 1993. Despite Secretary Hull’s entreaties, Congress did not act. 
Mere equalization of the rights of male and female U.S. citizens to give their 
children citizenship generated substantial political opposition. While 
women’s groups were the driving force behind reform, other important con-
stituencies opposed the law, including the State Department; Lieutenant 
Colonel Ulysses S. Grant III, representing the American Coalition of 
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Patriotic Societies; and the American Federation of Labor, which argued that 
“the real and proper way to equalize the status of men and women . . . would 
be to amend the bill by denying automatic citizenship to any children born 
in foreign countries, unless both the father and the mother are citizens . . . .” 
Because passage of the bill at all was precarious, Congress resolved only 
discrimination against mothers.  
The inter-department committee that President Roosevelt directed to re-
view the nationality laws in 1933 issued a monumental report in 1938 that 
formed the basis for the comprehensive Nationality Act of 1940. While 
those born in limbo or without citizenship had reason to complain that Con-
gress should have acted sooner, it is not surprising, unconstitutional, nor an 
invitation to judicial re-drafting that Congress delayed revision until the 
completion of an expert study.  
Children born in outlying possessions left aliens under the 1934 law 
were in good company. All foreign-born children were aliens if born be-
tween 1802 and 1855 to parents who became citizens after 1802, as were all 
children of U.S. citizen mothers and alien fathers until 1934. Foreign-born 
adopted children of naturalized citizens were made citizens by statute, 8 
U.S.C. § 1431(a), but such adopted children of “native born” U.S. citizens 
were aliens until 2001 under The Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (codified at 
8 U.S.C. § 1431(b)). Children of U.S. citizen fathers born out of wedlock 
are not automatically citizens under current law, according to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1409(a). An apologist for the piecemeal legislative tradition of the past 
two centuries could say that none of these classes of alien children of U.S. 
citizen parents were exiled or outlawed. Certainly, it is hardly unprecedented 
for complex statutory regimes to fail to solve all related problems at once 
(or to offer incomplete, contradictory, and inconsistent coverage) and yet 
accurately reflect what Congress was able to agree to enact into law. If par-
ticular children did not want to be U.S. citizens—and surely the class of 
those born outside of the United States are less likely to want to live in the 
United States than those born in the United States—no harm was done by 
failing to grant that status automatically. If they did want U.S. citizenship, 
they might well be able to become citizens through individual application 
under general naturalization statutes or other law with the advantage of hav-
ing U.S. citizen relatives.  
The demographics of the Canal Zone presented an additional political 
complication explaining delay. From 1790 to 1965, federal law restricted 
immigration and naturalization of non-whites. Bill Ong Hing describes 
some such restrictions in his book Making and Remaking Asian America 
Through Immigration Policy: The immigration of Africans and Asians was 
prohibited or discouraged until 1965; from 1790 until 1952, Congress re-
stricted naturalization by race, limiting it first to “free white persons;” for a 
period, female citizens who married Asian aliens were automatically expa-
triated. Informed policymakers were aware of the centrality of racial 
restriction in the era of Senator McCain’s birth. For example, a unanimous 
1922 Supreme Court decision—Ozawa v. United States—holding Japanese 
persons racially ineligible to naturalize, called the racial bar a “rule in force 
from the beginning of the Government, a part of our history as well as our 
law, welded into the structure of our national polity by a century of legisla-
tive and administrative acts and judicial decisions.”  
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Because of the paramount concern of some in Congress about the racial 
composition of the immigrant stream, it legislated cautiously with respect to 
the Canal Zone, as it had with the 1934 revision of section 1993. Indeed, 
admitting more whites was a prominent argument in favor of the 1934 revi-
sion. As reported in volume seventy eight of the Congressional Record, 
Representative Samuel Dickstein, chair of the House Committee on Immi-
gration explained this reasoning: 
To illustrate the inequality of the present law, let us consider on the one 
hand the case of children born out of the United States to a couple, the man 
being of Chinese ancestry but a native-born American citizen and the 
woman ineligible to citizenship, and on the other hand the case of children 
born out of the United States of the union between a native-born white 
woman and a Britisher. . . . In the case of the Chinaman, the children arriv-
ing at the port of entry . . . are admitted as American citizens, whereas the 
white child of the native born American woman married to the Britisher is 
held back and is called an “alien.” Because of the inequality of the present 
law, that child derives the citizenship of the alien father, even though the 
mother is a native-born white American citizen. 
Representatives grilled witnesses on racial risks at the 1937 hearing on 
the Canal Zone citizenship bill before the House Committee on Immigration 
and Naturalization. During hearings on the bill, witnesses such as H.A.A. 
Smith, Chief of General Purchasing Office for the Panama Canal Zone, re-
assured legislators that the bill offered no benefits to ethnic Panamanians or 
“Negroes,” arguing that it was “no attempt to bring in half-breeds or anyone 
else like that.”  
Representative Charles Kramer of California observed, “Now, you are 
going to run into a situation where American men come down there and 
marry one of those Koreans, Japanese, or Chinese, and perhaps after a short 
time abandon the wife and there will be a child born, and you are going to 
bring these children in as American citizens.” H.A.A. Smith assured the 
Committee that such children “would not come under this bill at all.” 
The Committee apparently wished to avoid granting citizenship to the 
children of African Americans. Illinois Representative Noah Mason ob-
served that “there are very few colored American citizens down there.” After 
Chairman Samuel Dickstein agreed that “[p]ractically 90 per cent or more 
of those affected would be of white American stock,” Representative Mason 
concluded that he did “not see that there is very much to fear from the pas-
sage of this bill in that respect.” When Representative William Poage of 
Texas noted that “[y]ou are going to make these children born of Negro and 
Indian women with American fathers, going to make American citizens out 
of every one of them,” Representative John Lesinki, Sr. of Michigan asked, 
“Why not make this bill apply only to the white race?”  
There was no need to limit the bill to whites in the text because it would 
be limited in effect. H.A.A. Smith assured the committee that the bill had 
been carefully drafted to avoid unfortunate racial consequences. After Rep-
resentative Poage noted that “You have got about 22,000 Negroes employed 
there,” Smith explained that as non-U.S. citizens, “they are not covered by 
this bill. . . . we do not want to give them by this bill any rights whatever as 
American citizens. That is why we have drafted this in this way.” 
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Surprisingly, Smith testified that racial considerations led the Canal to 
oppose an earlier proposal that would have made citizens of all children 
born in the Canal Zone, including, of course, those black or brown. “We do 
not want to bring in all the children that are born in the Canal Zone,” Smith 
explained. “Two or three years ago we had up the proposition that was ad-
vanced to make all children born in the Canal Zone American citizens. We 
have fought that consistently, the Canal has.” The Canal Zone authorities 
thought that it was more important to exclude children of native Panamani-
ans and other alien workers than to ensure that the children of U.S. citizens 
were birthright citizens. This makes perfect sense, in a way; sooner or later 
white children were likely to be made citizens. But a hastily drafted bill 
benefiting Panamanians or “Negroes” would have irreversible conse-
quences.  
The careful drafting succeeded. The House Report assured Members of 
Congress that the bill was:  
[E]ntirely different from legislation that would confer citizenship on resi-
dents of territories of the United States of different blood. The bill . . . 
would not confer citizenship on any alien employee or the children of such 
alien employee, even though such alien children were born within the lim-
its of the Canal Zone. 
Not every Representative was persuaded; the Congressional Record notes 
that one well-traveled member objected that “there are more nationalities 
and more cross-breeds of all kinds in the Isthmus of Panama than any other 
place in the world.” The vote reflected the anti-immigration sentiment of 
many in Congress. After several Representatives on both sides switched 
their votes, the final tally was 146 aye to 144 nay; a single vote prevented 
failure through a tie. Even for a bill benefiting the children of “our men in 
the Army in the Canal Zone,” the House nearly decided to leave them in a 
“no man’s land.” The support most Americans now believe members of the 
armed forces deserve should not be imagined a consistent feature of our law 
or culture. Just short of half voted to leave such children without U.S. citi-
zenship, at least until, as Representative Tarver suggested, they made “some 
form of application.”  
III. Senator McCain’s Paths to Natural Born Citizenship 
Senator McCain’s conservative jurisprudence leaves him little room to 
criticize the discrimination that affected him; his view is that the courts 
should not change congressional decisions whether well founded or other-
wise. His legal philosophy also demands that judges should not make legal 
decisions simply to achieve outcomes they prefer, as described on the “Strict 
Constructionist Philosophy” entry on his website. “When applying the law,” 
he believes, “the role of judges is not to impose their own view as to the best 
policy choices for society but to faithfully and accurately determine the pol-
icy choices already made by the people and embodied in the law.” Since 
Congress determined that only children outside both the limits and jurisdic-
tion of the United States would be citizens, under Senator McCain’s 
approach, the question is closed.  
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While some may think that Congress should have granted citizenship to 
children of U.S. citizen military personnel in the Canal Zone earlier, Senator 
McCain’s view is that section 1993 cannot be judicially improved; judges 
should “faithfully apply the law as written, not impose their opinions 
through judicial fiat.” Whether Congress kept Senator McCain from being a 
citizen at birth because it was sloppy and slow, or merely careful and delib-
erate, judicial intervention is not justified. According to McCain, judges 
should “respect the lawmaking powers of Congress.” 
However, several more rights-protective doctrines, if accepted, would 
make him a citizen by birth. Those theories, implied in the analysis of the 
Tribe-Olson Opinion, represent the dreams of liberal jurists, lawyers, and 
scholars, who believe the courts have given Congress too much power over 
unincorporated territories, immigration, and citizenship. For Senator 
McCain to be a natural born citizen, the law must abandon a century of re-
strictive doctrines developed by conservative justices.  
A. Restricting Congressional Power by 
Overruling the Insular Cases  
Senator McCain would be a citizen at birth if the Insular Cases were 
overruled or limited to the extent that all persons born in U.S. sovereign ter-
ritory would be deemed citizens. There are good reasons to rethink the area. 
The Court’s determination that Congress can withhold the full protections of 
the Constitution from those in the territories rested on racial notions. As 
Justice Brown explained in Downes: 
[I]n the annexation of outlying and distant possessions grave questions will 
arise from differences of race, habits, laws, and customs of the people . . . 
which may require action on the part of Congress that would be quite un-
necessary in the annexation of contiguous territory inhabited only by 
people of the same race.  
The problem was that, according to the Court, some races were not suited to 
constitutional democracy:  
[Because the territories] are inhabited by alien races, differing from us in 
religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation and modes of thought, the 
administration of government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon prin-
ciples, may for a time be impossible; and the question at once arises 
whether large concessions ought not to be made for a time, that, ultimately, 
our own theories may be carried out, and the blessings of a free govern-
ment under the Constitution extended to them. We decline to hold that 
there is anything in the Constitution to forbid such action. 
As was his wont, Justice Harlan disagreed, asserting in the 1904 case Dorr 
v. United States that constitutional protections “are for the benefit of all, of 
whatever race or nativity, in the States composing the Union, or in any terri-
tory . . . over the inhabitants of which the Government of the United States 
may exercise the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.”  
If Justice Harlan’s view prevailed, the Canal Zone would have been “the 
United States,” subject to the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—and John McCain would be a natural born citizen. However, 
if Senator McCain were a citizen at birth because of the Insular Cases’ 
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invalidity, so too would millions of others, born in unincorporated territories 
under U.S. jurisdiction, be. All persons born in the Philippines between 
1898 and 1946 and all persons born in the Canal Zone between 1904 and 
1979 would apparently be Fourteenth Amendment birthright citizens. By 
statute—8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g)—most of their children 
and some of their grandchildren would be also be citizens.  
B. Restricting Congressional Power by Recognizing 
Common Law Citizenship 
The Tribe-Olson Opinion also alludes to principles of citizenship extant 
at the Founding, implying a potentially profound basis to reform U.S. na-
tionality law. The very existence of the natural born citizen clause—the 
argument goes—demonstrates that some people are citizens by birth in the 
United States. Yet, before the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, no law granted or recognized citizenship by birth in the United 
States. Accordingly, the Constitution necessarily recognized citizenship 
based on law other than federal statute or constitutional provision, and the 
courts so held. The inevitable source is the common law in effect when the 
Constitution was drafted and ratified. Perhaps Congress may, under its natu-
ralization authority, grant citizenship to those who do not obtain it under 
common law, but Congress may not deny citizenship to those entitled to it 
under the original Constitution. While the First Congress passed a statute 
granting citizenship to children born abroad, perhaps the statute was de-
claratory of the common law, not a determination that the common law of 
citizenship had been supplanted.  
If the Constitution preserved citizenship under common law, Senator 
McCain would likely be a birthright citizen. Of course, overruling this as-
pect of Wong Kim Ark and Rogers would open up a world of challenges to 
current nationality laws. There would be in effect two constitutional citizen-
ship clauses—that in the Fourteenth Amendment and the natural born 
citizen clause—to be elaborated by the courts. Many of the Supreme Court 
cases in this area have been decisions upholding denial of citizenship to for-
eign-born children of U.S. citizen military personnel who did not satisfy 
requirements imposed by Congress. Perhaps the Court was wrong to defer 
to Congress, and the Constitution should have been read more expansively 
to uphold individual rights in this area.  
C. Restricting Congressional Power by Overruling the 
Plenary Power Doctrine 
Senator McCain could be a citizen if courts applied equal protection re-
view to the law in effect in 1936. At least as to the children of citizens, there 
are strong arguments that citizenship by descent is worthy of protection, 
perhaps in the way that voting rights are. While, as explained in Rogers, “the 
Court has specifically recognized the power of Congress not to grant a U.S. 
citizen the right to transmit citizenship by descent,” once Congress acts, the 
right to live in the same country as one’s family should not be withheld for 
insubstantial reasons. Senator McCain’s mother could have, as many Ameri-
cans did, delivered in Colon Hospital in Colon: a facility built, owned, and 
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located in a town owned by the Panama Railroad, a U.S. company, but under 
Panamanian sovereignty. In that case, he would have been a citizen at birth 
under section 1993 because he would have been born out of both the terri-
tory and jurisdiction of the United States. It is irrational that he should be 
denied citizenship based on that geographic triviality.  
However, under a principle called the “plenary power doctrine,” judicial 
challenges to immigration and citizenship policies are strictly limited. The 
reverse of strict scrutiny, plenary power review is deferential in theory, vir-
tually non-existent in fact. To this day, no person denied immigration or 
citizenship based on race, political belief, sex, out-of-wedlock birth, or sex-
ual orientation has persuaded the Supreme Court that such discrimination is 
unconstitutional. As stated in the 1889 case Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, exclusion of undesirables might well be “essential . . . to the preser-
vation of our civilization.” On that basis, the Court held in Fiallo v. Bell that 
“ ‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more 
complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens” and that it is unobjection-
able that “in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and 
naturalization, ‘Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable 
if applied to citizens.’ ” Thus, to give one example of judicial respect for 
congressional policymaking in this context, in the face of a statute appar-
ently advantaging naturalized citizens, the Court unanimously upheld in 
Chong Fook v. White the exclusion of the wife of a natural born U.S. citizen: 
“The words of the statute being clear, if it unjustly discriminates against the 
native-born citizen, or is cruel and inhuman in its results, as forcefully con-
tended, the remedy lies with Congress and not with the courts.”  
The Tribe-Olson Opinion’s claim that the Framers cannot have intended 
a child born to U.S. citizens to be a non-citizen was a claim about the com-
mon law and the meaning of the Constitution, but it also sounds in equal 
protection. Other foreign-born children of U.S. citizens became U.S. citi-
zens at birth, as Senator McCain would have had his mother elected to 
deliver a hundred yards over the border in the Republic of Panama. Birth in 
the Canal Zone is justifiably treated differently from birth in other parts of 
the world, but those differences probably warrant more favorable treatment, 
not less, as Congress determined in the 1937 Act. Arguably, a well-
functioning Congress would not have left those born in the Canal Zone in 
limbo for years after the problem became clear in 1932.  
A determination that Senator McCain was born a citizen because others 
with less claim to citizenship received it at birth would be path breaking 
both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, it would be a rejection of 
the principle that only Congress can make citizens. Substantively, it would 
hold up a legal regime historically full of contradictions, ironies, and lacu-
nae to standards of logic, consistency, and fairness. Although the full 
consequences of those changes are unknown, they would be substantial. 
Conclusion 
From Mark Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson to Gregory Howard Williams’ 
Life on the Color Line, American letters are filled with stories of people 
whose identity rested on the idea that they were one thing but were shocked 
to find that they were another. Undoubtedly, Senator McCain has believed 
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that he was a citizen from the moment he was born. However, under the law 
as it existed in 1936, he was not. To learn that one was not a citizen when 
born might well be as stunning as learning that one was adopted.  
For a number of reasons, it is a bitter irony that McCain should find 
himself in this legal gap. He has a reputation for advocating moderate poli-
cies with regard to immigration. In addition, it is preposterous that in 2008, 
a presidential candidate—a Caucasian no less—should be caught up in an-
tique technicalities of the legal regulation of race.  
In the 2000 Republican primary, while leading in the polls, McCain be-
came the subject of a smear campaign. McCain and his wife had adopted a 
daughter with dark skin. According to an article his campaign manager, 
Richard H. Davis, wrote in the Boston Globe, before the South Carolina 
primary, “[a]nonymous opponents used ‘push polling’ to suggest that 
McCain’s Bangladeshi-born daughter was his own, illegitimate black child.” 
McCain was defeated; George Bush became the Republican nominee and 
president. Race baiting may well have cost McCain the presidency in 2000. 
And now, it appears, racial considerations have frustrated his legal abil-
ity to be president by keeping him from being deemed a citizen at birth. 
First, the doctrines of the Insular Cases, predicated on race, kept the Canal 
Zone from being part of the United States for purposes of the citizenship 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, the plenary power doc-
trine, predicated on race, now precludes successful challenges to irrational 
citizenship laws. Finally, Congress and the Canal Zone authorities delayed 
legislation for years, the former because of government inertia and anti-
immigrant sentiment, the latter until they could ensure the law would not 
benefit non-whites. These decisions left McCain a non-citizen at birth.  
The legacy that led to his lack of citizenship at birth, however, may give 
him an avenue that would make him eligible to the office of president and be 
faithful to his strict constructionism. Some Caucasian families would not 
adopt a dark-skinned child; that the McCains do not have that attitude sug-
gests the absence of strong racial antipathies. McCain’s sensitivity to race is 
also suggested by his April 2008 speech in Selma honoring the forty-third 
anniversary of the Selma-to-Montgomery march. In his speech, he praised 
Democratic Representative John Lewis, whose skull was fractured in the 
march. For all that appears, McCain disapproves of race discrimination in 
addition to not being a race baiter. Of course, that choices made by the peo-
ple and their representatives and embodied in law are motivated by 
discrimination has justified judicial intervention even among judges re-
garded as conservative. Thus, perhaps unreasonable immigration and 
citizenship policies should not be protected by old doctrines rooted in ra-
cism, even if in other areas courts should carefully defer to the legislature.  
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